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Abstract—we  all  receive  paper  based  certificates  during  our 
study journey, but they are hard to manage to avoid damage or 
loss.    The  field  of  e-Learning  provides  technological 
developments, such as e-portfolios, which enable greater power 
and flexibility in displaying achievements.  These may include 
on-line  versions  of  certificates  of  the  applicant's  attainment 
which  overcome  the  limitations  of  paper-based  versions.  
However, these “e-certificates” present a number of practical 
challenges, which so far have not been addressed, such as the 
validation  of claimed e-qualification certificates.  This  paper 
addresses the issues, and explores the gap between current e-
portfolio  tools  and  the  desired  e-qualification  certificate 
system.    Through  analysis  of  the  existing  systems  and  e-
certificate use cases, we have identified existing services that 
can  be  reused  and  the  services  that  require  further 
development, thereby presenting an approach which solves the 
above  problems.    Preliminary  results  indicate  that  the 
recommendation  from  this  research  meets  the  design 
requirements,  and  could  form  the  foundation  of  future  e-
certificate implementations. 
Keywords  —  e-qualification  certificate,  e-certificate,  e-
portfolio, e-learning, trust 
I.   INTRODUCTION  
Education certificates provide physical evidence of our 
achievements, milestones of our learning journeys, and are 
important documents that everyone needs for further study or 
employment.  However, these paper-based certificates also 
come with management problems.  They are easily lost or 
damaged,  and  they  are  hard  to  prove  genuine  when 
presented. 
The  field  of  e-Learning  provides  technological 
developments, such as e-portfolios, which are being explored 
as an improvement over paper-based portfolios in the job and 
course  application  process.    However,  forged  certificates 
exist due to poor security in e-portfolio systems.  Therefore, 
the students’ claimed achievements within e-portfolios need 
to  be  verified.    Abrami[1]  notes  that  it  is  difficult  to 
authenticate the evidence in e-portfolio.  The study of how 
we can engender trust in our on-line versions of certificates / 
qualification records, and making sure that our sensitive data 
are not being misused, is still at an early stage. 
Currently, there are methods, projects, and commercial 
systems  present  in  the  related  domain,  such  as  digital 
signature, eCert[2], and Europass[3].  However, they don’t 
satisfy  our  requirements  sufficiently  due  to  their  various 
design purposes.  (Analysis in section III) 
In order to solve the above problems, it is necessary to 
implement an electronic version of qualification certificates 
(e-certificate)  that are  at  least  as  valid  as  the paper-based 
certificates,  and  can  be  used  either  as  a  standalone 
application  or  fitted  within  other  applications,  such  as  e-
portfolios.  It needs to be easy to use and suit all levels of 
students  while  including  high  security  methods  to prevent 
forgery.  The students need to have control over the usage of 
such  e-certificate,  and  there  must  also  be  a  verification 
method  provided.    We  need  to  secure  the  e-certificate 
system,    not  just  the  e-certificate.    Figure  1  outlines  the 
challenges and the requirement of a possible solution.   
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Figure 1.   Challenges and Requirements.  
II.  DOMAIN RESEARCH: THE CURRENT SITUATION 
Before considering an e-certificate system, it is important 
to  review  the  context  of  the  paper-based  certificate,  its 
certification  process,  and  its  related  areas,  such  as  the  e-
portfolio research.  These will identify the requirements and 
methodology to investigate the e-certificate system. 
Four main areas were considered as directly related to the 
e-certificate  system,  which  are  shown  diagrammatically  in 
Figure 2.   Related issues
(e.g. trust, culture, 
and legal issues. )
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Figure 2.    Related area of e-certificate 
  An  e-certificate  is  an  end  product  of  a  successful 
certification process. 
  Its  security  control  will  be  the  key  factor  of  a 
successful system. 
  Its  structural  design  will  affect  the  adaptability  to 
other systems, such as e-portfolios, which is one of 
its main usage areas. 
  Its  social  impact,  such  as  trust,  culture,  and  legal 
issues need to be addressed 
From  this  figure,  we  may  note  that  the  e-certificate 
system  is  considered  to  involve  three  processes:    issue, 
distribution, and verification; and has four main factors that 
affect  the  system:  certification,  security,  e-portfolio,  and 
related issues.    
Certification:  the  certification  process  for  an  academic 
achievement  involves  the  processes  of  registration  and 
examination,  and  can  be  paper-based,  computerized,  or 
practically.  The certificates, as the end result of a successful 
certification process, sometimes come with time limitation, 
such  that  revocation  and  re-certification  is  required[4].  
Therefore, in our case of an e-certificate system, it requires 
the  personal  data  and  qualification  records  to  be  stored 
electronically to identify the person who we are issuing to, 
and verify that they have passed the relevant exams.  The 
system will also need to have functions for validating and 
revoking any issued e-certificates when necessary. 
Related  issues:  Different  countries  have  different 
cultures, data protection acts, and legal issues; this may have 
an effect on the e-certificate system design.  For a digitally 
signed certificate, the Europass[3] clearly states that, “The 
Europass Certificate Supplement is not: a substitute for the 
original certificate;” or “An automatic system that guarantees 
recognition”, while the Digitary[5] claims that their digitally 
signed documents are legally valid and tamper evident.  To 
be  a  true  replacement  of  the  paper-based  certificate,  our 
designed e-certificate will need to have the same legal effect 
as the paper-based certificate.  The legal issue will be the 
main area to be investigated. 
Security: To secure a computer-based system, we need to 
find out what threats it faces, what vulnerabilities it has, what 
controls  it  needs;  and  consider  them  through  five 
components: hardware, software, data, policies and people; 
we  also  need  to  determine  the  right  balance  between  the 
three goals: confidentiality, integrity and availability.  In our 
case of e-certificate, we need to consider all these areas in 
our design, and find the right balance among the goals so that 
the system is user friendly while maintaining a high level of 
security. 
E-portfolio: There are six types of e-portfolios.  One that 
relates to the e-qualification certificate is the presentation e-
portfolio, which is used for students and graduates to give 
evidence  of  learning  or  achievement  and  showcase  their 
qualifications  and  competencies  while  moving  into  or 
through the workforce or further education.   
The e-framework has been the backbone to help build 
interoperable  tools  for  eLearning,  such  as  the  ones  for  e-
portfolios[6, 7].  It has been facilitated by choosing a Service 
Orientated Architecture (SOA)[8].  The Service Orientated 
Reference  Model  (SORM)[9]  was  conceptualized  to 
encapsulate the e-framework research process.  The eP4LL 
(E-portfolios  for  Lifelong  Learning)  project  developed  a 
reference  model  for  E-portfolios  for  the  e-framework[10]. 
The  RIPPLL  (Regional  Interoperability  Project  on 
Progression  for  Lifelong  Learning)  has  tackled  the 
authentication issue between institutions it links by using a 
SSO (Single-Sign-On) system, where the identity of a user is 
supported  by  their  home  institution  when  accessing  other 
institutions’ systems[11].  
The main body of research into e-portfolios has been into 
defining reference models for the domain, such that these can 
be  developed  into  a  body  of  interoperable  reference 
implementation  services  and  tools.    It  is  apparent  that 
although the eP4LL models define the use cases for the  
exchange  of  portfolio  data,  from  an  e-certificate 
perspective  they  are  limited,  as  neither  has  described 
explicitly  the  security  issues  raised  by  transmitting  data 
between multiple, and not always known, parties; and there 
still  is  no  mechanism  to  authenticate  the  veracity  of  the 
portfolio data  transmitted  between  institutions  in  RIPPLL.  
As  Peter  Rees  Jones[10],  an  eP4LL  project  member, 
comments on his blog: “Security and Trust: the [e-portfolio] 
Reference Model sidestepped this key issue”. However, the 
SORM  methodology  has  been  identified  to  investigate  e-
certificates. 
From the benefits and issues of the e-portfolio studies, it 
is required that the e-certificate system design: 
  needs to suit students with low IT skills 
  prevent forgery 
  protect privacy 
  allow for verification of the certificates  
  satisfy legal requirements, such as data protection, 
copy  right,  Intellectual  Property  Rights  (IPR), 
ownership and stewardship 
  allow  for  easily  transfer  of  certificates  between 
different systems 
  minimize data storage requirements  III.  RELATED SYSTEMS AND METHODS: WHAT IS ALREADY 
AVAILABLE 
A.  Digitally signed document 
Technologies  exist  in  related  domains,  such  as  digital 
signatures,  which  are  used  in  e-documents  to  provide 
authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation.  However, for 
the  requirements  of  an  e-qualification  certificate,  it  has 
critical security holes and missing functions: for example, it 
uses the keys to verify the modification of the document, but 
doesn’t  start  the  validation  of  the  public  key  certificates’ 
status  automatically.    This  may  result  in  a  forgery  being 
accepted if the key has been compromised.   Furthermore, 
even the signer’s public key certificate has been validated, 
but the signed document itself hasn’t.  In our case of an e-
qualification certificate, the signed document itself is also a 
certificate,  which  may  have  a  valid  period  (e.g.  first  aid 
certificate),  and  may  be  revoked  in  a  later  stage  (e.g.  if 
discovered,  after  the  certificate  has  been  issued,  to  have 
cheated in exam or to have plagiarized).  The problem we are 
dealing  with  is  a  (certificate)
2  issue,  therefore,  a  simple 
digital  signing  of  the  document  alone  doesn’t  solve  the 
problem.   
B.  Europass 
The  European  Community  provides  a  Europass 
Certificate  Supplement  and  a  Diploma  Supplement[3].  
These  provide  facsimiles  of  award  certificates  and 
information about  the qualification.    However, the  system 
clearly states that, “The Europass Certificate Supplement is 
not:  a  substitute  for  the  original  certificate;”  or  “An 
automatic system that guarantees recognition”.    But, this is 
not good enough for the security in real world.   Also, the 
document  is  not  suitable  as  a  standalone  proof  of 
qualification in an e-portfolio as its detailed records, such as 
individual module marks, may work against required privacy 
issues.  
C.  the eCert project 
A e-certification project, eCert[2], has explored the issues 
of  three-party  authentication  and  produced  an  award 
verification  demonstrator.    But  it  only  verifies  input 
qualification  records  against  linked  institution  databases, 
which will be limited.  By using this method, it also increase 
the  risk  of  database  attacks  to  those  institutions.    What’s 
more,  it  doesn’t  involve  e-certificates,  so  our  paper-based 
certificate problem remains unsolved.  
D.  The Chinese Certificate Information Verification 
service 
The  Certificate  Information  Verification  services  in 
China[12] is a e-certification service similar to eCert.  With 
different set of input and output The service will take unique 
student numbers and unique certificate numbers as input, and 
output  the  specified  qualification  detail  along  with  the 
student’s personal detail, including a photo.  It provides more 
reliability to the viewers as it also verifies the identity of the 
person. But this method doesn’t suit every country, e.g. it 
against  the  data  protection  law  in  UK.    And  again,  this 
service doesn’t deal with e-certificates.   
E.  Digitary (Digital Notary) 
The Digitary system[5] issues, distribute and authenticate 
e-certificates over the internet with the system installed to 
institutions  individually.    Students  need  to  login  to  their 
institution’s system to access and manage their e-certificates, 
such  as  set  access  tokens  for  individual  reviewers.    
Reviewers  can  then  access  the  e-certificates  through  the 
received  URLs  using  the  access  tokens;  this  may  involve 
registration process depending on the access level that was 
set.  This is the closest system to our idea of the e-certificate, 
except the system only works for institutions individually, 
this is good for the e-certificate issuing process, but is not 
suitable  for  reviewers  who  need  to  verify  information 
received from a wide range of institutions.  It also comes 
with storage issues as it requires the system to maintain all 
students’  e-certificates,  their  different  version,  and  the 
corresponding access tokens for life,  
IV.  FORMATION OF USE CASES: THE NEW SYSTEM 
We attempted to adopt the Service Orientated Reference 
Model  to  investigate  an  e-certificate  system  as  an  e-
Certification  technique.    Hence,  for  our  first  step,  the  e-
certificate usage patterns are identified and formalized as use 
cases.    This  process  involves  identifying  the  e-certificate 
stakeholders, developing the cases where these stakeholders 
act, whilst considering similar techniques that address similar 
issues.  
A.  Stakeholders analysis 
The  e-certificate  has  three  stakeholders,  as  showed  in 
Figure  3:  the  issuer, owner,  and  reviewer.   They  perform 
three processes: issue, distribution, and verification. 
 
Figure 3.   E-certificate Stakeholder and Activities 
An e-certificate issuer is a body that creates and issues 
the certificate, such as a college or a university.  They may:   
  issue a huge range and amount of certificates 
  restrict  database  access  control  for  any  in  coming 
verification request to minimize database attacks 
An e-certificate owner is the certificate holder who has 
successfully passed the qualification certification process and 
gained the award, such as a student or a graduate.  They:   may be from about the age of 14, with no upper age 
limit 
  may  hold  low,  high,  and/or  special  level  of 
qualifications 
  may have qualifications achieved in different areas 
of UK (world-wide certificates are considered as out 
of the scope for this study) 
  have differing levels of IT skills 
  may or may not have an e-portfolio account 
An  e-certificate  reviewer  is  a  body  or  a  person  who 
receives the certificate in support of an application.  This 
may be an academic institution or an employer.  They: 
  could be an individual or big organizations 
  may  receive  e-qualification  certificates  as  part  of 
applications or within e-portfolios  
  may have few IT skills or may have a team of IT 
literate staff with high tech IT equipments  
  may need to check a few qualifications occasionally 
or  may  need  to  check  a  huge  amount  of 
qualifications efficiently 
  may need to review varied levels of qualifications 
that was issued across the UK  
B.  Scenarios 
With  these  three  stakeholders  in  mind,  scenarios  have 
been set up to help with the understanding of the situation, 
depicted in Table 1. 
TABLE I.   USE CASE SCENARIOS 
processes   Scenarios and conditions  
create   An exam board checks that the students have successfully 
passed the particular exams, and are who they claim to be, 
and then creates the E-certificates accordingly.  
-- This involves identification and verification against the 
exam  board’s  database.    The  creation  process  needs  to 
have  standard  control  for  both  low  and  high  level 
qualification  certificates  in  order  to  suit  educational 
institutions of a wild range.   
issue   The exam board issues the e-certificates for students.  But 
it may need to be withdrawn at a later stage.  
-- This needs security methods to a) indicate that the e-
certificates  are  issued  by  the  exam  board,  in  order  to 
prove its genuineness,  and prevent unauthorized editing 
and  copying  after  issue;  b)  give  support  for  the 
withdrawal mechanism; c) issue the e-certificates  
receiving 
award  
The  students  receive  their  e-certificates,  and  view  the 
contents.  
 --  This  needs  security  methods  to  control  that  no  one 
other than the students themselves can view their own e-
certificates.    
manage   A  student  specifies  certaine-certificates  to  be  visible  to 
particular employers.   
–  The  student  needs  to  be  able  to  control  which  e-
certificate(s) for which employer(s) and for how long they 
would  be  valid.    The  system  design  needs  to  be  user 
friendly, suitable for users without IT skills  
distribute   A  student  sends  the  selected  e-certificate(s)to  potential 
employers  
-- The student should be able to send the e-certificate(s) 
alone or within an e-portfolio.    
–  For  students  sending  the  e-certificates  through  e-
portfolio accounts, only the selected e-certificate(s) in the 
account should be visible to the employer(s).  
review   An employer views the received e-certificate(s)  
--  This  needs  security  methods  to  a)  ensure  only  the 
specified employer can view the e-certificate(s), but not 
anyone else; b)  protect from modifying and unauthorized 
copying.  
verify   The employer verifies the received e-certificate(s)  
–  The  system  need  to  be  able  to  verify  all  level 
qualifications that are issued using the same standard from 
any education institutions nationwide, and check that the 
e-certificate and the key are still valid  
C.  Use case diagram 
The scenarios are shown diagrammatically as use cases 
in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.   E-certificate use case diagram  
D.  Use case analysis 
From these use cases, we may note that the e-certificate 
system involves assertion, trust and privacy issues during its 
three processes.  
E-certificate  assertion:  the  system  need  to  be  self 
certificating to prove its genuine, and also to allow reviewers 
to  further  confirm  it.    This  is  important  from  both  the 
reviewers’ perspective, as it allows them to place value in the 
artifact, and for the issuers, as it insures the reputation of the 
certificates’ quality; especially as it is in the owners’ interests 
to aggregate their own attainments.  As well as generating 
these  assertions,  it  should  be  possible  to  withdraw  them.  
Parallels  can  be  drawn  with  Public  Key  Infrastructure 
certificate  systems,  which  provides  the  required  method 
while also maintaining a revocation list of keys which are 
invalid as they have been compromised[13].  
E-certificate  privacy:  e-portfolio  reference  models 
include  the  functionality  for  owners  to  be  able  to  create 
different “views” where “information relevant to a particular 
purpose”  is  selected  by  the  owner  for  a  selected 
audience[14]. This means the owner can tailor their portfolio 
to  best  support  their  application.  This  also  applies  to  e-
certificates,  as  no  matter  whether  it  is  used  standalone  or 
within an e-portfolio, one aim is to give students control over 
who can see their e-certificates and for how long.  This can prevent  untrustworthy  reviewers  republishing  the  e-
certificate without the owners’ permission.  For example to 
an e-portfolio bank which recruitment agencies might access.  
This is a similar paradigm to Web 2.0 social networking sites 
were a user can “categorize their network [of friends] into 
different access groups with different access privileges”[15]. 
Stakeholder Trust: A fundamental requirement from the 
use cases is the need to establish trust amongst stakeholders, 
such that one stakeholder can place faith that the identity of 
another  is  true,  as  no  value  can  be  placed  in  assertions 
generated,  or  any  private  data  shown,  to  a  party  whose 
identity  cannot  be  verified.    Ensuring  that  “chains  of 
academic  trust”,  which  are  constructed  as  learners  “gain 
acceptance into […] programs in large part by their standing 
in […] previous education”, must be able to be replicated 
within an e-certificate system[16]. Once more parallels can 
be drawn with PKI systems where trust networks have to be 
engineered in order for any other user to see value in the key 
certificates generated. This is typically achieved either with a 
hierarchy  of  globally  “trusted  nodes  called  Certificate 
Authorities”  (CA)  or  by  anarchy  based  methods  such  as 
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) where chains of trust are formed 
between users who already know each other[17]. 
Distributed  Stakeholders:  To  “stimulate  large-scale 
uptake”  of  users[10],  e-certificate  tools  need  to  define 
“architecture  of  participation”.  The  e-certificate  system 
won’t work unless there is a significant body of universities 
and  employers  who  will  accept  them.    This  concept  is 
defined  within  the  Web  2.0  community  as  the  network 
effects  that  are  achieved  when  “Users  Add  Value”  and 
encourage further users to participate[18]. 
V.  GAP ANALYSIS: WHAT IS REQUIRED AS A WHOLE 
The next stage in the SORM methodology, with the use 
cases defined, is to perform a gap analysis against current 
techniques and services to discover what can be reused and 
which technical gaps need to be addressed. 
Existing services: a) Service Orientated Architecture: By 
adopting  the  SOA  of  the  e-Framework  one  meets  the 
distributed  stakeholder  use  case  as  SOA  provides 
architecture  of  participation.    b)  Federated  Identity:  The 
formation of stakeholder trust has been addressed in previous 
e-framework  projects,  including  e-portfolio  projects,  by 
utilizing  the  open-source  federated  identity  system 
Shibboleth[11].  It is based on SAML (Security Assertion 
Markup  Language)  published  by  OASIS,  and  provides  a 
decentralized solution for institutions to share trusted user 
identities between each other, such that a home user identity 
is  valid  at  any  of  the  partner  institutions  within  the 
federation[19].  It  would  provide  a  framework  for  e-
certificate stakeholders to be able to lookup and verify the 
identities  of  other  stakeholders;  and  therefore  be  able  to 
place trust in their identity. However such systems may need 
to be extended or adapted in order to associate the identity 
token of an assessor with an issued certificate. 
Required Services: Current research is missing services 
to certify the veracity of any XML structure; therefore it isn’t 
possible  to  create  e-certificates  to  assert  that  an  XML 
fragment representing the qualification is genuine.  Such as 
mentioned before, a digitally signed document can have its 
modification, signer, and the signer’s CA validated, but not 
the content of the document.  This is crucial to e-certificate 
as this signed document itself is a certificate, and may have 
been  revoked,  therefore,  need  to  be  validated.    We  are 
dealing with a certificate
2 issue which involves public key 
certificate and e-qualification certificate.   
VI.  BRIDGING THE PROFILE GAP: WHAT SERVICES CAN BE 
ADAPTED AND WHAT NEEDS DEVELOPMENT 
A.  Assertion Techniques 
XML Signatures: An enveloped XML signature can be 
used  so  an  issuing  body  can  sign  that  a  qualification  is 
genuine and this signature can then be verified as required.  
To  ensure  that  the  qualification  XML  elements  are  not 
tampered after it has been signed, a digest of the document 
structure can be taken to accompany the issuers’ signature, 
allowing  a  reviewer  to  recalculate  the digest  to  assert  the 
certificate is original. However, we also need to validate the 
certificates’ state against two types of certificate revocation 
list (CRL): whether the signer’s key has been compromised 
or  the  qualification  certificate  has  been  redraw.  Without 
these assertions, we cannot say that the e-certificate can be 
accepted.  Unlike digital signing, all these processes need to 
carry out automatically.  A timestamp can also be added to 
enhance its integrity. 
XML Watermarks: An alternative could be to watermark 
the  XML  document.  Usually  used  to  prevent  and  detect 
“unauthorized  duplication  and  distribution”  of  data  to 
enforce copyright,  XML  watermarks  can  also be  used  for 
integrity  protection[20,  21].   Unlike  an  XML  signature, a 
watermark might not be obvious to an end-user, and hence 
provides  extra  security  through  obscurity.  Typically  a 
watermarked  document  will  require  less  file  space  than  a 
signed document, meaning an e-certificate would be easier to 
store and transfer between e-Certification stakeholders[21]. 
However,  it  only  asserts  the  document’s  integrity,  but  it 
cannot validate the source, in this case, the signer.   
B.  Privacy Techniques  
Content Extraction Signatures (CES): The privacy issue 
can  be  tackled  by  adopting  the  CES  with  created  access 
tokens.  CES  have  been  developed  to  “enable  selective 
disclosure of verifiable content”[22].  CES would allow an 
document signer to sign the document in fragments with a 
set  of  signatures,  and  these  individual  fragments  can  be 
blinded or extracted by the receiver with the corresponding 
keys.  The  access  token  will  control  who  can  see  the 
document  and  for  how  long.      Applying  these  to  e-
certificates,  the  initial  access  token  and  qualification 
fragments  can  be  signed  individually,  and  then  extracted, 
reformed, and signed by the student with a new access token.  
With different sets of access values, the e-certificate could 
then  be  sent  to  different  reviewers  with  different  access 
levels  while  the  signed  certificate  fragment  remains 
untouched.    However,  we  need  to  lock  the  document  to 
prevent further extraction, so that the reviewers cannot get 
hold of the qualification fragment without access control. VII.  PROPOSED SOLUTION: THE SYSTEM DESIGN 
The system design aims to solve the problems that arise 
from our current situation, satisfy the e-certificate use case 
requirements,  and  avoid  the  drawbacks  that  the  existing 
systems have. 
The development of the system will adopt the SOA of the 
e-framework to meet the distributed stakeholder user case.  
SOA  allows  developers to build  applications  from  sets  of 
services with well defined interfaces and is achieved without 
“tight  coupling  between  transacting  partners”[23].  When 
used  with  interoperable  e-portfolio  XML  schemas,  this 
makes  it  easy  for  any  e-portfolio  vendor  to  integrate  e-
certificate services into their application; hence enabling and 
encouraging  user  take  up  and  participation  between  users 
using software from potentially different providers. 
The system design overview: The institution will create 
and  issue  a  digitally  signed,  time  stamped,  and  access-
controlled  e-certificate  to  the  specified  student  through  a 
secured  emailing  system.    The  student  view  and  set  new 
access controls to the received e-certificate through a central 
system  before  sending  it  out  to  further  reviewers.    The 
reviewers also use the central system to view and verify the 
access-controlled e-certificate.  It is shown diagrammatically 
in Figure 5.   
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Figure 5.   E-Certificate system over view  
In order to secure such a system, a number of decisions 
have been taken: 
The system will be constructed in two parts: an issuing 
system and an online central system.  The issuing system can 
be  installed  in  individual  institutions.    The  online  central 
system will also be constructed in two parts: a management 
subsystem (for students) and a verification subsystem (for 
reviewers).    It  will  provide  services  for  e-certificates  that 
may be issued from any involved institutions, and will be the 
single  reference  point  nationwide.    This  will  prevent 
confusion where the reviewers don’t know which system to 
choose or which can be trusted, especially when they have 
many e-certificates issued by different institutions.   This will 
also  has  the  advantage  of  enabling  close  monitoring  and 
control against fake systems.  
All institutions that would like to use the system to issue 
e-certificates  will  need  to  be  certified  first,  ideally  a 
professional education body, e.g. the Ministry of Education, 
can be the roof of the trust node, so that no bogus institutions 
can be involved.  All members that represent their institution, 
e.g.  a  registrar,  will  also  need  to  be  certified,  and  to  be 
traceable back to the institution.  This is shown in Figure 6. 
Every student needs to register a student account when 
they start study at fifth form or college (the level that they 
will start to receive all sources of qualification certificates).  
The registration process will verify who the student is (same 
process as registering to a course at college).  Each student 
will  be  assigned  a  unique  student  id  nationwide.    This 
student  id  will  last  for  life.    Every  e-certificate  that  the 
student achieves will contain this id as proof of ownership.  
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Figure 6.   Create e-certificate  
All  certified  institutions  are  required  to  use  the  same 
standards and methods, so that the issued e-certificates can 
be  verified  by  the  central  system  nationwide.    All  e-
certificates will be in XML format, and provide information such  as  “valid  time”  and  “issue  time”  to  meet  the 
requirements of re-certification, revocation, and to deal with 
future software update issues.  Every e-certificate will have 
access control values e.g. who can see it and for how long. 
This  is  to  retain  control  of  the  distributed  e-certificates, 
protect the students’ privacy, and prevent any unauthorized 
use in the future.  These will be signed using the method of 
CES.    Timestamp  will  be  used  with  digital  signature  to 
ensure  tamper  evident  document,  which  can  neither  be 
repudiated, not accessed without authorisation. 
The institution is responsible for keeping the private key 
(signing key) secured, and making the public key available to 
the central system.  The students are responsible for keeping 
their e-certificates and the corresponding access information.  
In the case of loss of the original e-certificates, the institution 
must be contacted for reissue.   
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Figure 7.   Distribute e-certificate: institution students 
The institution will send the e-certificate to the specified 
student  through  its  internal  email  system  which  supports 
secure mailing functions.  This email will be signed, such 
that  the  email  will  be  verified  when  received,  and  the 
sender’s certificate can be traced.  Here, the sender can be 
different from the signer, e.g. an administrator.   The student 
will receive the digitally signed and encrypted e-certificates 
through  email; he/she can verify the email, trace the trust 
note of the sender, but can’t view the e-certificate without 
uploading it into the central system.  This is to ensure  e-
certificate privacy, and prevent misuse of stolen e-certificates 
due to unexpected mailing errors.  This is shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 8.   E-Certificate central system - management subsystem 
Students need to login and upload the e-certificate to the 
management subsystem to view and set new access tokens.  
Here,  the  federated  identity  system  Shibboleth  will  be 
adapted  for  the  login  control.    Once  the  e-certificate  is 
uploaded  and  the  access  token  entered,  the  system  will 
automatically carry out the validating processes, which will 
include a)whether the uploaded e-certificate is belonged to 
the student – prevent access to stolen e-certificates that come 
with  corresponding  access  tokens,  b)the  access  token  is 
correct and within the access time limit, c)the e-certificate 
has not been modified, withdrawn, and is within the valid 
time limit, such that no recertification is required yet, d)the 
signing  key  has  not  been  compromised. This  is  shown  in 
Figure 8. 
For viewing and verifying an e-certificate, reviewers only 
need to upload the received e-certificate and enter the access 
token  into  the  verification  subsystem;  the  verified  e-
certificate will be display automatically if it has successfully 
passed all the validation checking processes.  This is shown 
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Figure 9.   E-Certificate central system - verification subsystem 
VIII.  VALIDATION OF DESIGN  
Self validation of the system design has been carried out 
against the e-certificate use cases, it is believed that it meet 
all  the  specified requirements.    Interviews  have  also been 
carried out within the University of Southampton, some year 
3  students,  HR  managers,  exam  board  officers  have  been 
carefully  selected  to  represent  the  three  stakeholders.  
Received commends are positive, they were happy to see the 
secure controls meeting their needs in different stages, while 
some concerns have also been raised, such as the file size for 
mailing; and who may hold the responsibility of the central 
system, as it has the need of being trusted by all involved 
institutions nationwide – e.g. do they all trust the Ministry of 
Education  that  is  suggested  in  this  paper?    Overall,  the 
preliminary results indicate that the system’s structure and 
security design is successful, and could form the basis for 
future implementations.  Further validation will be carried 
out with IT security professionals, industry employers, and 
different levels of education institutions, to spot any security 
holes and required functions.   
IX.  FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION 
From  the  e-certificate  challenges,  gap  analysis, 
technology researches, to the new system design, we have 
proposed a solution for a secured e-certificate system. 
This  system  design  does  not  require  any  e-certificate 
copies and sensitive data, such as private keys, to be stored 
in  the  system,  while  it  provides  all  the  required  services 
through  a  secured  environment.    This  feature  has  a  huge 
advantage of minimizing the chances of being attacked and 
saving storage, especially when its usage is nationwide, and 
the  e-certificates  need  to  last  for  life.    This  becomes 
increasingly significant as the system grows in size.   
We also need to look into the legal issue of digital signed 
document as this is the key issue of whether the designed e-
certificate  system  can  eventually  replace  the  paper-based 
system. 
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